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Abstract.
As we become evermore aware of the costs and consequences of genocide and various other human
rights abuses, the recognition of the need for more effective prevention and intervention strategies
also becomes evermore clear. All too often when out- breaks of violence have occurred, the
international community has appeared power- less to prevent it and absolutely ineffective when
taking steps to stop the violence and the killing. Perhaps the worst contemporary example of this
impotence comes from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rooted in the destabilizing effects of
the 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda, the Eastern Congo has been the setting for mass rapes,
massacres, and other atrocities since 1995 as various factions and groups have struggled for power
and/or resources or have capitalized on the chaos and brutality. Some estimates suggest that more
than 5 million people have been killed since the outbreak of hostilities in the mid-1990s.1 This has
been the reality there, even though the Congo is the site of one of the longest-standing and largest
United Nations peacekeeping missions in existence. Begun in 1999, the United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, renamed MONUSCO in April 2010)
has gone from a contingent of about 5,000 troops and 500 military observers to over 20,0000 troops,
700 military observers, 1,000 police personnel, and several thousand assorted other civilian
personnel in early 2010.2 Despite this significant international presence, the violence has continued
to the present day. In fact, some of the more recent mass rapes and massacres have occurred in close
proximity to contingents of the UN peacekeeping forces, which have been unwilling or unable to
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intervene in these atrocities.3 Keep in mind that these are not always hit-and-run attacks that occur
too quickly for a peacekeeping response. In some cases, the assaults lasted for days. Clearly,
MONUSCO has not been very effective in preventing the victimization of innocents. Unfortunately,
this has often been more the norm than the exception in locations across the globe. The United
Nations and the International Community have usually been unable to prevent and unsuccessful in
intervening to stop atrocities.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp
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As we become evermore aware of the costs and consequences of genocide and various
other human rights abuses, the recognition of the need for more effective prevention
and intervention strategies also becomes evermore clear. All too often when out-
breaks of violence have occurred, the international community has appeared power-
less to prevent it and absolutely ineffective when taking steps to stop the violence
and the killing. Perhaps the worst contemporary example of this impotence comes
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rooted in the destabilizing effects of
the 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda, the Eastern Congo has been the setting
for mass rapes, massacres, and other atrocities since 1995 as various factions and
groups have struggled for power and/or resources or have capitalized on the chaos
and brutality. Some estimates suggest that more than 5 million people have been
killed since the outbreak of hostilities in the mid-1990s.1 This has been the reality
there, even though the Congo is the site of one of the longest-standing and largest
United Nations peacekeeping missions in existence. Begun in 1999, the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC,
renamed MONUSCO in April 2010) has gone from a contingent of about 5,000 troops
and 500 military observers to over 20,0000 troops, 700 military observers, 1,000
police personnel, and several thousand assorted other civilian personnel in early
2010.2 Despite this significant international presence, the violence has continued to
the present day. In fact, some of the more recent mass rapes and massacres have
occurred in close proximity to contingents of the UN peacekeeping forces, which
have been unwilling or unable to intervene in these atrocities.3 Keep in mind that
these are not always hit-and-run attacks that occur too quickly for a peacekeeping
response. In some cases, the assaults lasted for days. Clearly, MONUSCO has
not been very effective in preventing the victimization of innocents. Unfortunately,
this has often been more the norm than the exception in locations across the globe.
The United Nations and the International Community have usually been unable to
prevent and unsuccessful in intervening to stop atrocities.
Because of this apparent lack of prophylactic ability, we have seen the creation of
a number of reports, such as the Report of the International Commission on Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty, better known as Responsibility to Protect or R2P4
and the Albright-Cohen Report, Preventing Genocide.5 The purpose of these docu-
ments has been to chart a path forward so that the all too frequent mistakes of the
past will not be repeated. Both have been produced with a tremendous amount of
fanfare and high expectations for their implementation, although their impact to
date has been negligible and their long-term prospects unclear. Nevertheless, these
well-intentioned projects have been important first steps in conceptualizing and
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institutionalizing strategies to prevent genocide and related forms of human rights
violations and will hopefully help create and spur further action. To this list, we
can now add MARO: Mass Atrocity Response Operations; A Military Planning Hand-
book, which seeks to outline how military interventions to save civilian lives should
take place. Comprehensive and thorough, MARO is intended to provide a framework
to assist the military in visualizing the relevant issues and assessing the specific
difficulties inherent in military interventions to prevent atrocities. The handbook
is also intended to guide the planning and implementation of such a response.
This is certainly no abstract theoretical exercise since it utilizes the insights and
experiences of a good number of active duty and retired military personnel. MARO,
in short, is grounded in the expertise derived from real world operations and
exercises. Therein lies the greatest strength of this project but also, however, what I
perceive to be a significant weakness.
The first issue that I have with this handbook concerns some fundamental
assumptions that are made by the architects of this plan and has nothing to do
with its content. For me, this first issue has more to do with the way we approach
or frame the topic rather than the actual strategies suggested or the ways in which
they should be implemented. Essentially, this handbook provides a planning guide
for military intervention. While I absolutely understand that military intervention
is sometimes necessary and that operational plans are crucial for any military
intending to act effectively in order to put an end to atrocities, I question our con-
stant willingness to privilege military options over other strategies of intervention.
This handbook continues that focus. If this were simply another internal military
operations guide or field manual—one of the many that presumably exist—that
would be one thing, but the widespread dissemination of this handbook and its
attendant publicity suggest otherwise. Essentially, MARO explicitly asserts its purpose
as such:
[MARO] seeks to enable the United States and the international community to stop
genocide and mass atrocity as part of a broader integrated strategy by explaining
key relevant military concepts and planning considerations. The MARO Project is
based on the insight that the failure to act in the face of mass killings of civilians is
not simply a function of political will or legal authority; the failure also reflects a lack
of thinking about how military forces might respond.6
This ambitious goal suggests that the MARO Handbook is intended to be or envisions
itself as an important component of US strategy when dealing with human rights
abuses. In some ways, MARO is analogous to FM 3–24, the US Army’s field manual
for conducting counterinsurgency operations, which was arguably not intended solely
for a military audience.7 Its widespread release for download and the fact that
it was printed as a book suggest that the public and political audience were impor-
tant constituencies whose support of the COIN (i.e., counterinsurgency) doctrine it
outlines was necessary. At that time, public support for the war in Iraq was in deep
decline and the marketing of the strategies outlined in FM 3–24, often referred to as
‘‘ the troop surge’’ or simply ‘‘ the surge,’’ helped garner enough popular and political
support for it to be implemented.8 The presentation of this document suggests a
comparable vision and/or approach.
This focus on military intervention is somewhat problematic since it helps to
frame and shape the nature of the discourse about options and policies in ways that
reflect an increasing orientation towards military solutions for international problems.
I do understand that the primary author of the handbook, Sarah Sewall, developed
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this initiative after having spent time in the Pentagon, that her experience there
has been fundamental in shaping the nature of this project, and that the numerous
military participants in this project were invaluable in creating a realistic document;
yet, it seems to me that, as a society, we already emphasize military options and
responses over diplomatic, legal, humanitarian, economic, and informational ones.
In his recent critique of our national security mindset, Andrew Bacevich points out
that since the Second World War our statecraft has ‘‘ emphasized activism over
example, hard power over soft, and coercion (often styled ‘negotiating from a position
of strength’) over suasion.’’9 This focus, however, comes at a cost. We tend to per-
ceive non-military options as too slow or too ineffective and often discount them in
favor of armed intervention strategies. We want quick solutions to difficult issues
and military options often appear to provide that. Yet we live in an increasingly
interconnected world in which international economic and social relations have a
power and relevancy all too frequently ignored by political and military strategists
who continue to perceive the world through old paradigms. This handbook, while
filling a gap in the military’s preparedness for humanitarian intervention, also
serves to perpetuate a mentality in which force remains a pre-eminent tool of
intervention. That is not to suggest that military interventions are already the most
common international tool. Far from it. But the frequency with which the United
States has engaged in military actions around the globe has increased to the extent
that this country exists, to borrow Bacevich’s term, in a ‘‘ condition approximating
perpetual war.’’10 If recent history is any guide, the United States is increasingly
relying upon its military forces to project American power abroad and to intervene
in a variety of settings for numerous causes. From Lebanon, Grenada, Kosovo,
Bosnia, and Somalia to Yemen, Haiti, Liberia, Columbia, the Philippines, Iraq, and
Afghanistan, it seems that the United States frequently relies on military inter-
vention for a variety of causes.
To be fair, MARO does explicitly assert that ‘‘Military FDO’s will be more effec-
tive when combined with diplomatic, informational, and economic actions’’ (69). Yet
the diplomatic measures, informational deterrent options, and economic deterrent
options discussed in this handbook are conceived as ways to prove support for mili-
tary operations, not the other way around. This is an extremely important point
since it suggests that the military options should enjoy supremacy over other non-
force based options. Is this appropriate? Should force and military intervention be
the default options for US strategy, even when other tools are available? Or should
military intervention be the fallback when other strategies fail? Given the hazards
and enormous costs of military intervention, economically but especially in terms of
human life and suffering, should we really be suggesting, either overtly or through
implication, that military intervention to curtail human rights abuses be our favored
approach? Although many non-military options, such as diplomacy and sanctions for
example, may take time to implement and come to fruition, it is equally true that
these alternatives can be quite effective and that a greater reliance on these kinds
of alternatives also demands a more proactive approach to dealing with atrocity
situations than we have often adopted. A great deal of work has been done in recent
years on developing effective tools for identifying precursors and warning signs for
genocidal atrocities and many NGO’s have become quite effective in calling attention
to developing situations in countries around the world.11 These alternatives, how-
ever, are typically not given the same weight as military solutions even though they
have the potential to prevent atrocities before violence ever breaks out. Military
intervention, on the other hand, is by definition reactive rather than proactive. The
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killing has already begun. Diplomatic, economic, informational, and other such means
dictate through necessity an earlier and more preventative approach. Additionally,
military interventions are absolutely fraught with a multitude of dangers that can
include an escalation of the conflict and the killing of civilians. The NATO inter-
vention in Kosovo, for example, initially served to accelerate the pace at which the
Serbs were targeting and killing Kosovar Albanians. When Slobodan Milosˇevic´, the
president of Serbia, began attacking Albanian separatists in Kosovo in 1998, the
international community began applying pressure for him to cease to no avail. Tired
of the delaying tactics used by Russia and China in the United Nations Security
Council, the United States and its’ NATO allies began a bombing campaign against
Serb forces in Kosovo and in Serbia itself that, apart from its questionable legality,
initially created more refugees and internally displaced persons and increased the
intensity and scale of the killings by Serb forces.12 Clearly, this was not the intended
outcome of this military intervention and, while it was ultimately successful, it took
over two months to achieve an end to the hostilities and, as noted above, increased
the numbers of civilian victims. American political leaders and NATO officials,
anxious to prove the relevance of NATO in a post-Cold War world, had not envi-
sioned the extent of Serbia’s resolve and its willingness to endure sustained air
attacks. In fact, the top military commander of NATO, General Wesley Clark, had
initially expected the mere threat of force to bring an end to the violence in Kosovo.13
This kind of difficulty is compounded in atrocity situations, which are notoriously
difficult and unpredictable. Atrocities tend to happen during times of other conflicts
such as civil wars or low intensity or insurgency wars. In these conflict zones, com-
batant groups are sometimes indistinguishable from civilian populations or groups
from both sides of a conflict engage in war crimes and atrocities. In this confusing
and dangerous context, the possibility of civilian casualties, or ‘‘ collateral damage’’
as they are sometimes euphemistically called, becomes very real and serves to
negate the gains from military intervention for humanitarian reasons. As MARO
acknowledges in the section titled ‘‘Moral Dilemmas,’’ ‘‘ In a MARO, the difference
between doing right and wrong will be strategically crystalline and tactically elusive.
Moral dilemmas will proliferate’’ (38). Clearly, military intervention is not neces-
sarily an easily implemented panacea and while the handbook acknowledges this in
the section titled ‘‘ Escalatory Dynamics,’’ I am not sure that the underlying implica-
tions of this reality are fully addressed.
Military interventions truly must be a tool of last resort. This particular critique
does not dispute or challenge the essential strengths of the MARO Handbook; rather
it questions the underlying assumptions implicit within its development and dis-
semination. My criticism is really about the frames of reference or the starting points
we use in order to understand and resolve a problem. MARO, unfortunately, repli-
cates our over-reliance on military solutions to international human rights viola-
tions. My argument, therefore, does not truly address the validity of the specific
suggestions contained in the handbook, but instead argues that we, as a society and
as individuals and groups interested in making the world a safer place for civilians,
need to emphasize more proactive and non-military approaches to resolving conflicts
and trouble spots before they ever erupt into atrocities.
My second major critique is closely connected with the first and also concerns the
narrow focus of the handbook. Essentially, the project treats military intervention as
a purely military issue without much regard for the political or social aspects of any
intervention or, as the authors put it, their purpose is to, ‘‘ answer the ‘how,’ not the
‘whether’ ’’ (13). Yet to ignore the political dimensions of intervention, even military
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interventions, is to suggest that they occur in a vacuum. While MARO does not
completely ignore the political realities of intervention, it does appear to suggest
that they are only ancillary to the organization and philosophy of this handbook.
The political sphere should be integral in the planning and development of such
a handbook. All too often military operations have been hampered and negatively
affected by a divergence and lack of cohesion between military goals and political
ones. I wonder if it would not have ultimately been more productive to have included
political actors in the creation process of MARO in order to integrate effective
strategies designed for better coordination and communication between the military
leaders responsible for humanitarian missions and the administration and political
leadership who must contend with popular opinion, international pressure, and
various other governmental and diplomatic concerns. While it is suggested that the
MARO Handbook provides an operationalization of the R2P document, this does not
substitute for the need to develop and embed mechanisms to address the political
realities of intervention within the MARO project. Additionally, R2P addresses three
main areas of responsibility that include the prevention of atrocities, reacting to mass
atrocities, and rebuilding after mass atrocities; MARO, therefore, only addresses one
of the three main goals of R2P.
Military operations are always constrained, shaped, altered, and retasked accord-
ing to the variable winds of the political situation and the more that a project such
as MARO can integrate clear guidelines and procedures for working with and within
political structures, the more effective such a project will ultimately prove. To
suggest that the political sphere is ancillary or irrelevant to the military is to ignore
certain realities. A good case in point is the American intervention in Somalia in
1992. Initially tasked with saving lives, Operation Restore Hope was created with
the intent to use American troops to create a more secure environment in which
humanitarian aid could alleviate the suffering of the Somali people by bringing in
food and other vital supplies to the starving population.14 While President Bush
overtly initiated this mission in response to humanitarian concerns, some have
suggested that it was also implemented partially to divert attention away from the
then ongoing situation in Bosnia and/or in response to being a lame-duck president
in need of a grand gesture. Regardless of the relative merits of these arguments,
there does seem to be a political role in the decision to send in troops. In response
to pressure from UN headquarters, American troops were nominally placed under
UN control. When the mission subsequently changed, with the prevalence of
American troops in combat operations and within the UN command structure in
Somalia, it was widely viewed as an American operation. The ‘‘mission creep,’’ as
it became known, led to the poorly informed decision to capture one of Somalia’s
leading warlords with disastrous results. Importantly, the widely viewed videos of
the bodies of slain American soldiers subsequently being dragged behind vehicles in
Mogadishu led to the American public’s widespread loss of confidence in the mission,
influencing then President Clinton to order the American contingent to head home.
At every stage of the process, political realities and pressures influenced the use of
military forces and this is unlikely to ever change. Suggesting that an important
next step involves ‘‘ harmonizing interagency roles’’ (102) and involving actors from
government and NGOs does not seem particularly helpful given that the terms of
the discourse have already been established.
Lastly, MARO appears to be remarkably unilateral in its orientation. In Part III,
‘‘ Future Research Areas and Ways Forward,’’ MARO ’s authors assert that ‘‘ for a
variety of reasons, the MARO Project’s efforts have been initially US-centric’’ (102).
Genocide Studies and Prevention 6:1 April 2011
74
This is problematic since it appears that, at least at this initial stage, the handbook
perpetuates a unilateral approach to the idea of military intervention that is
extremely troubling in this day and age. Regardless of the intention, American
actions have all too often been perceived extremely negatively at home, within the
affected region or nation, and internationally. Any single nation that engages in
unilateral action, especially if it often uses military intervention as a strategy, runs
the risk of having its motives discounted or assumed. Consider the recent case of the
2003 invasion of Iraq. Even though a small coalition of forces had been mustered in
support of the action, many around the world condemned the action as American
unilateralism at its worst. While American political and military leaders presented
the action as a part of the ‘‘ war on terror’’ and as a means of overthrowing a dictator
and spreading democracy, many within the international community, within Iraq,
and even within the United States saw it more as about a mission for oil and power
than anything else. This perception certainly helped to mobilize popular opinion
against the war in Iraq, and especially the American military presence there, and
ultimately helped fuel the nationalism and religious factionalism that turned Iraq
into a mass graveyard during the insurrection. That is not to suggest that multi-
lateral actions are easy to organize and implement. On the contrary, they are diffi-
cult, highly politicized processes that require a great deal of consensus and much
negotiation. Nevertheless, multilateral military interventions are inherently more
legitimate as they do not automatically invoke the same kinds of negative reactions
within the nation that is being invaded by troops and within the international com-
munity. In other words, the more nations that send troops to end atrocity crimes, the
harder it is to portray the intervention as illegitimate. As Martha Finnemore
reminds us, ‘‘ To be legitimate in contemporary politics, humanitarian intervention
must be multilateral.’’15
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